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The cognitive cell: bacterial behavior
reconsidered
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Research on how bacteria adapt to changing environments underlies the contemporary
biological understanding of signal transduction (ST), and ST provides the foundation of
the information-processing approach that is the hallmark of the ‘cognitive revolution,’
which began in the mid-20th century. Yet cognitive scientists largely remain oblivious to
research into microbial behavior that might provide insights into problems in their own
domains, while microbiologists seem equally unaware of the potential importance of
their work to understanding cognitive capacities in multicellular organisms, including
vertebrates. Evidence in bacteria for capacities encompassed by the concept of
cognition is reviewed. Parallels exist not only at the heuristic level of functional analogue,
but also at the level of molecular mechanism, evolution and ecology, which is where
fruitful cross-fertilization among disciplines might be found.
Keywords: cognition, evolution, signal transduction, memory, information-processing, valence, learning,
communication
Background
A New Look at an Old Idea
The idea that microbes might know their world, not merely bump into it, is controversial but uno-
riginal. At the beginning of the 20th century, Jennings (1905/1962) claimed the behavior of the
‘lower animals,’ notably paramecia but including bacteria, could tell us much about the behav-
ior of the ‘higher animals,’ including humans. The Animal Mind (Washburn, 1936), the ﬁrst
US textbook on comparative psychology (ﬁrst edition 1908), begins with amoeba. Biochemist
Daniel Koshland provided the modern scientiﬁc equivalent of Jennings’ argument in an under-
appreciated monograph on bacterial chemotaxis (CT) as a model system for the study of behavior,
and remarked (following Pope) that “the proper study of mankind is the bacterium” (Koshland,
1980b). Philosopher of science Karl Popper went further and argued (only slightly tongue-in-
cheek) that in the evolution of problem-solving “from the amoeba to Einstein is just one step”
(Popper, 1999).
More recently, in view of tremendous advances in methods for studying individual cells as
well as population-based microbial behavior, the bacterium has been compared explicitly to a
parallel distributed processing (PDP) network (Bray, 2009) that displays ‘minimal cognition’
(Lengeler et al., 2000; van Duijn et al., 2006; Shapiro, 2007). Arguments concerning bacterial
‘intelligence’ (Jacob et al., 2004; Hellingwerf, 2005; Marijuán et al., 2010) and even cells ‘think-
ing’ (Ramanathan and Broach, 2007) are appearing in mainstream journals, including the special
series in this one. British psychologist Richardson (2012), who has been researching human intel-
ligence (sometimes despairingly) since the early 1970s, recently concluded in an extraordinary
article in EMBO that the nascent study of unicellular intelligence might provide the key to under-
standing intelligence in complex vertebrates, including humans. Unknown to Richardson (2012),
a microbiologist specializing in computational biology has introduced a plausible formula for
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establishing ‘bacterial IQ,’ based on genome size and proportion
of DNA segments coding for signal transduction (ST) proteins,
as well as a rough gage of ‘introversion’ or ‘extroversion’ based
on the relative proportion of environment-contacting ST systems
(Galperin, 2005). Finally, neuroscientists and neurobiologists
tracing the evolution of complex human, brain-based behavior
increasingly locate its origins in the microbial realm (Allman,
1999; Damasio, 1999; Greenspan, 2007).
Yet, while work on bacterial adaptation underlies the con-
temporary biological understanding of sensory ST (Wadhams
and Armitage, 2004), and ST in turn provides the foundation of
the information-processing approach to cognition that (rightly
or wrongly) remains the hallmark of the ‘cognitive revolution’
(Miller, 2003), cognitive scientists are largely oblivious to research
in this and other areas of microbial behavior that might pro-
vide insights into problems in their own domains. For example,
some ﬂagellated bacterial species, paradigmatically Escherichia
coli, have been found to possess large clusters of interacting sen-
sory receptors, typically at the leading pole of the cell, which func-
tion as complex information-processing units linked to motor
activity (Hazelbauer et al., 2007) and have been dubbed by some
a ‘nanobrain’ (Webre et al., 2003). Meanwhile, microbiologists
seem equally unaware of the potential importance of their work
to understanding cognitive capacities in metazoans including
vertebrates.
In the hope of stimulating interest among microbiologists
in this area, this review brings together contemporary evidence
for cognition in eubacteria in core areas of cognitive research:
sensory ST, valence, communication, sensorimotor coordination,
memory, learning, anticipation, and decision making in complex
and changing circumstances. The article will show that paral-
lels exist not only at the heuristic level of functional analog,
but also at the level of molecular mechanism, evolution and
ecology, which is where fruitful cross-fertilization among dis-
ciplines might be found. Archaea, whose behavior is less well
documented and appear (so far) to possess far fewer ST systems
than bacteria (Ulrich and Zhulin, 2010), will not be discussed
here.
The review is organized into two parts. Part 1 provides an
introduction to the study of cognition. Part 2 sets out a pro-
posed bacterial cognitive toolkit. Because there is a great deal
of ground to cover, and not a lot of space to cover it in, the
mechanisms of how systems work will be sketched in broad
outline, not in detail, except in those cases where the details
are either not widely known or not easily accessible in the lit-
erature. The aim here is to stimulate microbiologists to think
about their work in the broader context of a cognitive biology
(Kovác, 2000; Auletta, 2011; Bechtel, 2014; Fitch, 2014) and to
consider designing experiments to explicitly enhance this under-
standing.
Part 1. Cognition: a Biological Function
Unlike Any Other?
Whether or not bacterial behavior ultimately should be described
as ‘cognitive’ is a matter for the scientiﬁc community to decide,
when consensus ﬁnally forms around what cognition is (Bechtel
et al., 1998). The absence in psychology and elsewhere in the
cognitive sciences of agreed deﬁnitions for key concepts, such
as cognition, has been decried for well over a century – James
(1984) arguably setting the benchmark for despair – and con-
tinues to be a cause for concern (Staats, 1983; Sternberg, 2005).
As it stands, cognition, like ‘intelligence,’ is a highly polysemic
theoretical construct that can be deﬁned quite broadly (La Cerra
and Bingham, 2002) or very narrowly (Wynne, 2004), depending
on the investigator’s personal intuitions and the ground in which
those intuitions are embedded, whether in the principles of biol-
ogy or the human case (Lyon, 2006; see Table 1). Needless to say,
this state of aﬀairs is far from ideal.
The study of cognition as a biological function may be unique
in the life sciences in the extent to which ﬁndings ultimately are
calibrated against a single species, Homo sapiens (Shettleworth,
1993). The study of respiration and other biological functions,
for example, are not so calibrated, although scientiﬁc investiga-
tion doubtless began with concern for the human case. (We stop
breathing, we die – so what is breath?) Rather, evidence is fol-
lowed wherever it leads, and it can lead to unexpected places.
We know now that the oxidation of nicotinamid dinucleotide
(NADH), the molecular substrate of cellular respiration, is a pro-
cess universally shared, and in animals is relevantly similar across
phyla. By contrast, prokaryotic memory was discovered more
than four decades ago (Macnab and Koshland, 1972), yet is far
from being accepted – even by microbiologists – as anything rel-
evantly like memory in complex vertebrates, to say nothing of
humans. Cognitive scientists might be similarly dismissive were
they to give it any thought at all.
Memory, needless to say, is critical to cognition. Without
memory, present circumstances have no context; the detection
of change is impossible. Without the ability to detect change,
the decision to alter behavior can only be random, haphazard.
Without memory, learning of any kind is impossible. While
cognitive scientists now accept that discoveries concerning the
molecular basis of memory in the marine invertebrate Aplysia are
relevant to the study of human memory (Kandel, 2006), they (to
say nothing of microbiologists) have yet to connect the dots with
memory processes in prokaryotes.
Nevertheless, similar ST mechanisms appear to be at work,
albeit with diﬀerent leading biochemical actors and diﬀerent
degrees of regulatory complexity. For example, ST in bacterial
two-component systems (2CSs) relies principally on histidine
kinases for protein phospho-transfer and DNA methylation,
while genomic analysis shows that serine/threonine kinases, their
analog in eukaryotes, comprise roughly 1 in 4 of the more
than 500 protein kinases involved in ST in humans (Capra
et al., 2006)1. However, analysis of bacterial genomes increas-
ingly reveals serine/threonine kinases in prokaryotes, partic-
ularly those that live in changing environments and display
complex social behavior, such as myxobacteria (Munoz-Dorado
et al., 1993; Schneiker et al., 2007), Bacillus subtilis (Macek
et al., 2007), and Paenibacillus vortex (Sirota-Madi et al., 2010).
1According to Capra et al. (2006), approximately 20% of the human genome codes
for proteins involved in signal transduction.
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TABLE 1 | Broadly biological and narrowly human conceptions of the capacities encompassed by the general concept of cognition (Lyon, 2006).
Capacity Biological (broad) Human (narrow)
Affect Valence: attraction, repulsion, neutrality (hedonic response). Hedonic response plus conditioned or unconditioned cognitive
appraisal (i.e., this is good/not good).
Sense perception Ability to recognize existentially salient features of the external or
internal milieu.
Conceptually mediated feature sensing.
Discrimination Ability to determine that a state of affairs affords an existential
opportunity or presents a challenge, requiring a change in internal
state or behavior.
Ability to differentiate a state of affairs as a particular state of affairs and
not another; having a concept.
Memory Retention of information about a state of affairs for a non-zero
period.
Retained information spatio-temporally decoupled from an immediate
stimulus, which can be explicit/declarative or implicit/ procedural.
Learning Experienced-modulated behavior change. Classical conditioning; ability to change rules governing behavior.
Problem solving Behavior selection in circumstances with multiple parameters and
high degrees of uncertainty; adaptability.
Rational decision-making, abstract thinking.
Communication Mechanism for initiating purposive interaction with conspecifics (or
non-conspecific others).
Verbal or written symbol systems whose units have semantic content
(meaning) and their deployment is organized according to rules (syntax),
both of which are conventionally established expressly for the purpose
of information exchange.
Motivation Teleonomic striving; implicit goals arising from existential conditions. Goal-driven behavior; goal is explicit (i.e., to the agent).
Anticipation Behavioral change based on expectancy (i.e., if X is happening,
then Y should happen).
Expectation based on past experience (potentially) explicit to the agent;
planning.
Awareness Orienting response; ability to selectively attend. Reflexive awareness; ’what it is like to be X’.
Self-reference Mechanism for distinguishing ‘self or’ like self from ‘non-self’ or ‘not
like self’.
Self-awareness; concept of ‘self’.
Normativity Error detection, behavior correction. Value assignment based on experience, motivational state and/or
convention.
Intentionality∗ Directedness toward an object. Beliefs and desires.
∗A philosophically derived ‘mark of the mental’ popular in the 19th and 20th centuries (Crane, 1998).
Calcium/calmodulin-dependent kinase II (CaMKII) is a ser-
ine/threonine kinase critical for memory formation in humans
(Giese and Mizuno, 2013). Does it have a prokaryotic homo-
logue? To my knowledge, no one is looking.
In short, in contrast to other life scientists, as well as to their
forebears of yesteryear, contemporary cognitive scientists have
been less inclined to follow the Darwinian principle – that bio-
logical functions diﬀer substantially ‘in form but not in kind’
(Darwin, 1874/1909) – very far ‘down’ the phylogenetic yellow
brick road in the search for clues as to the what and why of
cognitive function (Bekoﬀ et al., 2002).
Behavior generation lies at the heart of all cognitive inquiry,
and while unicellular organisms are simpler than metazoans in
structure, they are not always behaviorally less complex. The well-
described social predation style, rippling behavior and fruiting
body formation of Myxococcus xanthus arguably are more com-
plex than the activities of most Porifera and even some worms
with simple nervous systems. Extensive experimental evidence
shows that microbial behavior is guided by processes that, in
other contexts, are readily regarded as part of biological cogni-
tion, capacities which together encompass an organism’s ability to
navigate, become familiar with, value, learn from and solve criti-
cal existential problems within its world of experience, including
coordinating action with conspeciﬁcs. This may explain why, for
the past several decades, microbial researchers increasingly have
helped themselves to cognitive terminology (i.e., ‘decide,’ ‘talk,’
‘listen,’ ‘cheat,’ ‘eavesdrop,’ ‘lure,’ ‘vote’) to describe complex bac-
terial behavior, often without caveat (e.g., Adler and Tso, 1974;
Fuqua and Greenberg, 1998; Ben-Jacob et al., 2004; Bassler and
Losick, 2006; Baker and Stock, 2007; Williams et al., 2007).
In the following pages I hope to show that such linguistic usage
is not wholly metaphorical. I believe there is something going
on at the microscopic level that doesn’t just ‘look’ cognitive, it is
cognitive, or, more accurately, it is typically considered cognitive
when studied in animals more like us.
Biological Cognition
Discussions of cognition across phyla often degenerate into
qualms about deﬁnition that typically begin with ‘yes, but what
do youmean by. . .’ The concept that guides this investigation will
be speciﬁed therefore. Because we are not concerned with the spe-
cial capacities of a single mammalian species (i.e.,Homo sapiens),
a general deﬁnition from comparative psychology will serve, with
some modiﬁcation. Shettleworth (1998, p. 5) deﬁnes cognition as
“the mechanisms by which animals acquire, process, store, and
act on information from the environment. These include percep-
tion, learning, memory, and decision making.” Cognition thus
is comprised of the total suite of mechanisms that underwrite
information acquisition, storage, processing, and use. Although
this deﬁnition can be applied to phyla Shettleworth (1998) may
not have had in mind, e.g., microbes, it is (for the most part)
uncontroversial within the domain of comparative psychology
and cognitive ethology.
Shettleworth’s deﬁnition, and others like it in the cognitive
scientiﬁc literature, emphasizes the psychologically delineated
elements of the function. Others concerned with the speciﬁcally
Frontiers in Microbiology | www.frontiersin.org 3 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 264
Lyon The cognitive cell
biological manifestation of cognitive function – which histori-
cally includes William James, H.S. Jennings, Jacob von Uexküll,
Konrad Lorenz, James J. Gibson, and Humberto Maturana—
emphasize the ecological context of information ‘use,’ what cog-
nition does for the organism in the business of staying alive in
a particular ecological niche. With this in mind, I extend the
deﬁnition as follows:
Biological cognition is the complex of sensory and other
information-processing mechanisms an organism has for becom-
ing familiar with, valuing, and [interacting with] its environment
in order to meet existential goals, the most basic of which are
survival, [growth or thriving], and reproduction. (Lyon, 2014,
p. 174)
While they have several forms of metabolism not found in any
eukaryote (e.g., nitrogen ﬁxation, methanogenesis), prokaryotes
possess most of the biological functions shared by all animals,
either by virtue of their own structure or those of their symbionts.
Bacteria possess processes for breaking down and transforming
nutrients into usable forms of energy for self-production or gen-
erating behavior, storing energy in molecules that can be catab-
olized when needed, and eliminating molecular waste generated
during these processes. To stay alive, bacteria also appear to pos-
sess a ‘basic toolkit’ (Godfrey-Smith, 1996), which in other forms
of life—especially mammalian life – would be termed cognitive.
In the case of well-studied bacterial species (e.g., E. coli, B. subtilis,
M. xanthus, Pseudomonas aeruginosa), the basic toolkit includes
at least eight capacities found in diﬀerent but recognizable forms
in complex metazoans (see Box 1).
Like all organisms, bacteria adapt to changes in their envi-
ronment by modifying their metabolism and behavior. The
traditional view is that this process depends on a limited num-
ber of highly canalized, inﬂexible mechanisms, which bear little
resemblance to their behavioral counterparts in animals with
nervous systems. However, evidence increasingly points to the
idea that bacteria—particularly ecological ‘generalists’ as distinct
from ‘specialists’—are highly social, ﬂexible responders, respon-
ders (however limited their actual response styles) that rely
on a sophisticated suite of sensory and information-processing
mechanisms (Shapiro, 1998). Such mechanisms are characterized
by non-linear responsivity, integration of multiple information
channels, and (in the case of CT receptors, at least) habitua-
tion and adaptation phenomena. These structural and dynamical
features are among the deﬁning features of neuronal sensory
processing in animals, including humans.
Keep in mind that a great deal of complexity will be obscured
in the simpliﬁcations that follow. In each cell of E. coli, for exam-
ple, which is not the smartest proteobacterium on the block (but
no dummy, either), there are upward of 10,000 chemoreceptors
per cell, each with multiple binding sites, whose output interacts
with several ﬂagella, on each of which are about 40 binding sites
for CheY-P, the protein that modiﬁes the direction of rotation.
The behavioral output for a single cell is thus hugely complex,
and much more reﬁned (tumbles, twiddles, etc.) than normally
described. When we simplify to get just two outputs, run and
tumble, and then bundle behaviors to get population averages, a
lot of the cognitive output is likely to be occluded. Consider an
example with humans: if we assumed just two behaviors, walking
and standing, and measured population averages using diﬀerent
stimuli, more would be hidden in the results than is revealed2.
Part 2. The Bacterial Cognitive Toolkit
As do animals and plants, bacteria monitor the biotic and abiotic
features of their surrounding milieu using a wide variety of sen-
sory systems, and adapt their behavior and physiology in response
to what they perceive in order to stay alive and reproduce. While
the ecological niche of some bacteria is fairly stable, if sometimes
extreme,many inhabit highly mutable environments and conduct
highly complex lifestyles within them, which present consider-
able challenges, some of which are capable of being anticipated
and others not. Like all organisms, bacteria do not gather infor-
mation in a vacuum, but are able to assess the signiﬁcance of the
signals they receive relative to their own functioning, their inter-
nal milieu—although it is worth noting that the power spectrum
of signals remains unknown for any bacterium3.
In the psychological literature, assignment of an existential
value to the sum of information concerning current circum-
stances, internal and external, is called valence, which has been
2This paragraph is derived from personal communication with Jeﬀry Stock.
3I am indebted to Klaas Hellingwerf for this observation in this form of words.
BOX 1 | The basic cognitive ‘toolkit.’
Sensing/Perception The capacity to sense and recognize (re-cognize) existentially salient features of the surrounding milieu.
Valence The capacity of an organism to assign a value to the summary of information about its surroundings at a
given moment, relative to its own current state.
Behavior The capacity of an organism to adapt via changing its spatial, structural or functional relation to its external
or internal milieu.
Memory The capacity to retain information about the immediate (and possibly distant) past, and to calibrate the
sensorium to take account of this information, for example, via signal amplification.
Learning The capacity to adapt behavior according to past experience, enabling a faster response time.
Anticipation The capacity to predict what is likely to happen next based on an early stimulus.
Signal integration (decision making) The capacity to combine information from multiple sources, because all organisms appear to sense more
than one thing, and some bacterial species are equipped to sense dozens of different states of affairs.
Communication The capacity to interact profitably with conspecifics, including initiating collective action, which may or may
not include an explicit method of differentiating ’us’ from ’them’.
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described as ‘a basic building block of emotional life’ (Barrett,
2006). Valence refers to the attractiveness, acceptability or toler-
ability of a stimulus (Lyon, 2014). Usually such stimuli are ren-
dered in terms of ‘positive’ or ‘negative,’ ‘attractant’ or ‘repellant,’
in addition to neutral stimuli to which the organism is indiﬀer-
ent, but these characterizations are not always stable. Aversive
conditioning depends on the capacity of previously neutral or
even positive stimuli to become negative for an organism under
particular circumstances. Thus, all sensory signals have a context-
dependent valence—positive, negative or neutral—which inﬂu-
ences the available response.
Inmammals specialized brain-based systems exist for this pur-
pose, notably the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and
the limbic system, which together appraise for a given signal not
only what it is and where it is but also what it means ‘for me’
(Vedder, 2008). This involves brain structures such as the amyg-
dala and the orbitofrontal cortex. Although bacteria lack such
specialized organs, the valence of a signal is implicit in the pro-
cesses that coordinate, say, the rotation bias of ﬂagellar motors
or the complex developmental sequence of signaling, genetic
transcription and protein expression that leads to sporulation.
One of the most resilient obstacles to thinking about microbes
as potentially cognitive organisms is the lack of specialized sen-
sory and information-processing systems that exist in vertebrates
and especially mammals. In bacteria “sensory, regulatory, and
metabolic networks must all drive environmental perception and
corresponding action” within the boundaries of a single cell
(Freddolino and Tavazoie, 2012; p. 364). In actual fact, while
cognitive scientists for many years have tried to draw principled
distinctions between ‘metabolic’ and ‘cognitive’ function (even in
microbes—see, for example, van Duijn et al., 2006), this divid-
ing line is increasingly diﬃcult to defend even in human beings,
given increasing understanding of immune system involvement
in normal memory and learning (Yirmiya and Goshen, 2011)
and the surprising eﬀects of psychological stressors on metabolic
physiology (Maier and Watkins, 1998; Yirmiya et al., 2006).
Sensing: What’s Out there and What’s in Here
Bacteria are capable of sensing and responding to an astonish-
ing variety of environmental signals: amino acids, sugars, oxy-
gen, pH, osmolarity, temperature, light, secondary metabolites,
molecular waste products (e.g., ammonia), environmental DNA,
and other microbes (both conspeciﬁcs and other species)—even
physical objects such as tiny, chemically inert beads (Dworkin,
1983).
Signal transduction systems in bacteria come in several basic
forms that perform a wide range of behavioral and physiological
roles (Ulrich and Zhulin, 2010): one-component systems (1CSs);
2CSs, which also come in hybrid forms; CT systems, a special
sub-class of 2CSs; extracytoplasmic function (ECF) sigma factor
proteins, the so-called ‘third pillar of bacterial ST’ (Staron´ et al.,
2009), as well as non-canonical systems that involve three and
more components (Marijuán et al., 2010).
One-Component Systems
One-component systems consist of a single polypeptide chain
containing both a sensor domain that registers a stimulus/signal
and an output domain that elicits a response, for example, bind-
ing to DNA or interacting with other eﬀector proteins. Thought
to be evolutionarily older, 1CSs monitor the level of intracel-
lular metabolites or respond to concentrations of membrane-
permeable extracellular ligands (Galperin, 2005; Ulrich et al.,
2005). Ulrich and Zhulin (2010) conclude on the basis of genomic
data from thousands of species of bacteria and archaea that 1CSs
are the most numerous by a considerable margin (see Table 2).
Two-Component Systems
Two-component systems segregate the sensor/input and eﬀec-
tor/output functions between a sensory kinase (SK), which upon
stimulation autophosphorylates, typically at a highly conserved
histidine residue, and a response regulator (RR) to which the
SK binds and transfers phosphoryl groups, sometimes at multi-
ple sites. Phosphorylation and dephosphorylation, which occur at
diﬀerent rates at diﬀerent sites, may aﬀect transcription directly
or as one step in a signaling sequence (Krell et al., 2010). The
high-energy state created by modiﬁcation of the RR constitutes
a marker of environmental conditions at a particular time, which
lasts until the chemical group is removed, thus constituting the
basis of molecular memory (Koshland, 1977). Although 2CSs are
commonly comprised of membrane-bound sensors interacting
with the surrounding milieu and with one or more intracellu-
lar RRs, in some systems both components are located entirely
within the cytosol (Krell et al., 2009).
Multi-Component Systems
Because 2CSs have two inherent advantages—multiple possibili-
ties for control and graded signal ampliﬁcation—they appear to
form ‘phospho-relay systems’ with other regulatory components
that employ transient phosphorylation as a means of transducing
signals within the cell (Hellingwerf et al., 1995). Processes that
support the creation of phospho-relay systems include cross-talk
between (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2009) and/or constitutive con-
vergence of pathways (e.g., Tagkopoulos et al., 2008). Thus a
phospho-relay systemmay incorporate a single accessory protein,
which recognizes the signal/stimulus and transmits the molecu-
lar information to the sensor kinase, making a three-component
system (Krell et al., 2010). Other systems comprise several com-
ponents. For example, E. coli has a seven-component signaling
system for detecting orthophosphate (Pi) and regulating the
genes of the phosphate (Pho) regulon through the PhoR/PhoB
2CS, a paradigm in bacteria of a membrane-bound receptor con-
trolling cytoplasmic gene expression (Hsieh and Wanner, 2010).
Pi is the bacterium’s preferred source of phosphorus, which is
essential for physiological functioning, not least due to its ubiqui-
tous role in ST. The seven protein components include the PhoR
histidine kinase and its cognate PhoB RR; four components of
the ABC transporter Pst; and PhoU, a chaperone-like protein that
inhibits PhoR/PhoB (Hsieh and Wanner, 2010).
Extracytoplasmic Factors (ECFs)
The third most abundant ST elements in bacteria belong to the
family of sigma (σ) factors, which bind to RNA polymerase to
promote genetic transcription, the basic ‘housekeeping’ form of
which is present in all RNA polymerase holoenzyme complexes
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TABLE 2 | Genome size and signal transduction, by millions of base pairs (Mbp) and type of system.
Organism Genome (Mbp) 1CS 2CS CT ECF OTHER TOTAL
Vibrio parahaemolyticus 39.3 2,624 497 149 20 31 3,321
Burkholderia xenovorans 9.7 719 152 46 12 8 937
Myxococcus xanthus 9.1 315 263 60 41 8 687
Escherichia coli 0157 7.6 362 78 13 1 5 459
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 6.4 447 131 46 21 8 655
Vibrio harveyii 6.1 417 90 35 6 7 555
Vibrio cholerae 4.2 230 89 66 3 6 394
Bacillus subtilis 4.2 254 71 18 7 2 352
Staphlococcus aureus 3.1 119 34 – – 2 155
Mycoplasma genitalium 0.6 5 – – 1 – 6
Buchnera aphidocola 0.4 3 – – – – 3
Two-component systems includes canonical types as well as those with hybrid components. Source: The MiST2 database: a comprehensive genomics resource on
microbial signal transduction. Ulrich and Zhulin (2010) Nucleic Acids Research, doi: 10.1093/nar/gkp940. (Accessed 21 Feb 2015 at http://mistdb.com/)
(Mascher, 2013). ECFs belong to the σ70 subfamily of alternative
σ factors. The average bacterial genome contains six (Staron´ et al.,
2009), although some species contain none (e.g., Streptococcus
aureus) while others contain many (e.g., 41 inM. xanthus; Ulrich
and Zhulin, 2010). Alternative sigma factors possess diﬀerent
promoter-recognition properties, which increase the options for
transcription under challenging conditions. As Gruber and Gross
(2003, p. 441) put it: “The cell can choose from its repertoire of
sigmas to alter its transcriptional program in response to stress.”
This suggests signiﬁcant heterogeneity may exist in sigma fac-
tor utilization between cells, based on individual history as well
as growth stage, which may provide a source of selectable vari-
ability. Mascher (2013, p. 153) observes that the majority of ECF
groups are phylum-speciﬁc, “reﬂecting the similar life style and
physiology of a given group of related organisms.” The activity of
many sigma is typically controlled, and normally suppressed, by
a cognate anti-sigma.
The activity of alternative sigma factors can be quite complex.
Induction of the general stress response in B. subtilis is mediated
by σB, which is activated by energy stress in “discrete stochastic
pulses,” the frequency of which increases with increasing levels of
stress (Locke et al., 2011). The σB circuit constitutes a highly sen-
sitive, stochastically activated phosphorylation switch controlled
by positive and negative feedback that can either amplify the cir-
cuit or switch it oﬀ. These properties—ultrasensitivity, stochastic
switch-like behavior and the capacity for autoampliﬁcation—are
characteristic of neural networks (Bray, 2009).
Autoinduction: Indirect Sensing Via Proxies
Autoinduction is the process by which an organism synthe-
sizes a class of molecules, called autoinducers (AIs), which
stimulate a change in genetic expression in the organism itself
when the molecules reach a threshold concentration (Miller
and Bassler, 2001). The change may result in the produc-
tion of other molecules that perform functions—classically,
bioluminescence—or initiate a complex regulatory cascade that
leads to a global transformation of the cell, as in sporulation.
The term quorum sensing (QS) was introduced when it became
apparent that genetic changes were induced at concentrations
that seemed largely dependent on population density (Fuqua
et al., 1994), although see the section on “Communication and
Sociality” below. The supposition is that QS systems ensure that
individuals do not act in ways that are too costly and unproduc-
tive when undertaken by one or a few cells. A few cells releasing a
virulence factor will be swiftly attacked by a host immune system;
bioluminescent molecules secreted by a lone symbiont will not be
visible.
Autoinduction is widely considered to be a form of com-
munication to facilitate cooperative behavior and is the basis
for many collective activities, including: social motility, such
as swarming (Daniels et al., 2004); production of secondary
metabolites, such as virulence factors, bacteriocins, toxins, biolu-
minescence, degradative enzymes, exopolysaccharides, and pig-
ments (Bassler and Losick, 2006); global changes of cell state,
such as the transition from exponential growth to the stationary
phase (Lazazzera, 2000), initiation of chromosomal replication
(Withers and Nordstrom, 1998), and induction and regulation of
sporulation (Shank and Kolter, 2011); lateral gene transfer (Lanka
and Pansegrau, 1999); symbiotic mutualism (Visick and McFall-
Ngai, 2000); pathogenic infection (Von Bodman et al., 2003; Asad
and Opal, 2008); and bioﬁlm formation, maturation and disper-
sal (Kjelleberg and Molin, 2002; Oppenheimer-Shaanan et al.,
2013).
In diﬀerent species AI systems may have widely diﬀering
regulatory components and molecular mechanisms. Commonly,
however, AI concentrations are detected via ligand binding at
membrane-bound receptors (2CSs) or via intracellular receptors
that detect membrane-diﬀusible peptides (1CSs), and detection
at threshold stimulates not only changes in the cell’s genetic tran-
scription but also up-regulates AI production (Rutherford and
Bassler, 2012). The signal is thus ampliﬁed.
Four QS systems have been identiﬁed as ‘canonical,’ two each
for Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria (Rutherford and
Bassler, 2012), although there are others. Several species oper-
ate two autoinduction systems, but some operate three, such
as the bioluminescent Vibrio harveyii (Mehta et al., 2009) and
the opportunistic pathogen P. aeruginosa (Jimenez et al., 2012).
Waters and Bassler (2005) identify three types of “network archi-
tectures” for the operation of multiple QS systems: parallel, serial
and antagonistic. Parallel systems may serve to ﬁlter out noise,
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either from non-signaling molecules in the environment or from
signal mimics, operating much like multiple signatories on a
bank account (Taga and Bassler, 2003). By contrast, the QS sys-
tems in P. aeruginosa are initiated sequentially, enabling the
expression of diﬀerent virulence factors at diﬀerent times. In B.
subtilis the QS network is based on two peptides that operate
antagonistically, stimulating one of two mutually exclusive devel-
opmental programs, competence or sporulation, depending on
context (Waters and Bassler, 2005).
The reason autoinduction is important from a cognitive stand-
point is twofold. First, it increases the level of complexity of signal
integration within the cell, and suggests there is a hierarchy of
signaling values based on the concentrations of these molecules.
Second, it involves the use of proxies for conditions that can-
not be sensed directly, for example, population density or the
physical properties of the surroundings. AIs thus may provide a
paradigm case of biological ‘information’ that is conventional—
deployed with a degree of arbitrariness, as in language—or, in the
case of biological systems, evolved via natural selection to have
the meaning it does (i.e., the genetic code; Smith, 2000).
In actual fact, all biological ST systems have this quality of
assigned or evolved meaning, even those that directly sense fea-
tures of the environment, once the signal is transduced into
the cell. Protein interactions become what Millikan (2004) calls
“pushmi-pullyu representations,” which simultaneously transmit
what is the case and what to do about it. In the evolution of
communication systems, this is the beginning of “primitive con-
tent” (Harms, 2004). This is not the only view of what constitutes
communication and how it evolved, particular in microbiology
(see Keller and Surette, 2006, for an alternative view), but it has
a robust foundation in the study of language, comparative psy-
chology, cognitive ethology, and philosophy of mind (Oller and
Griebel, 2004).
Communication and Sociality
The domain of communication—notably, the ascription of ‘coop-
eration’ or ‘sociality’ to collective bacterial activity—is where the
interpretation of bacterial behavior begins to resemble debates
in comparative psychology over whether certain animal capaci-
ties are ‘genuinely cognitive’ or not, where the benchmark is the
human case (Shettleworth, 1993). Social behavior brings into play
capacities traditionally conceived of not only as cognitive but
also distinctly human: intelligence, the ability to communicate
meaningfully with conspeciﬁcs in order to coordinate behavior,
to distinguish between self and others, to interpret and track oth-
ers’ behavior over time, and culture (De Waal and Tyack, 2003).
Aristotle identiﬁed ‘calculative reason’ as the deﬁning property
of the human psyche precisely because humans live complex
social lives (Aristotle, 2001). Sociality requires cooperation and
coordination, not merely acting together. Not surprisingly, the
evolution of sociality has been a hotly disputed area of theoret-
ical discourse in biology for several decades (Segerstrale, 2001),
and remains so today. (See, for example,Wilson andWilson, 2007
andWest et al., 2007 for two diametrically opposed reviews of the
same subject.)
The contemporary case against the unwarranted ascription
of sociality to microbes was provided by Redﬁeld (2002) in a
much-cited article raising important questions, which to that
time had not been asked, about the nature and function of autoin-
duction. Research was proliferating into QS as a form of bacterial
communication. The notion of bacteria as social, evenmulticellu-
lar organisms was gaining currency (Shapiro and Dworkin, 1997;
Crespi, 2001), and increasing research into bioﬁlms suggested
that microbial social life might be quite cosmopolitan, involv-
ing mixed populations and featuring divisions of labor (Watnick
and Kolter, 2000). Few questioned the social hypothesis of QS,
or attempted to bring an evolutionary understanding to the dis-
cussion. (For an important exception, see Brown and Johnstone,
2001.)
Arguing almost entirely in evolutionary terms, Redﬁeld (2002)
warned against the uncritical interpretation of autoinduction as
a form of bacterial communication facilitating social behavior.
According to Redﬁeld’s (2002, p. 365) somewhat narrow render-
ing of evolutionary theory, QS genes could only evolve in situa-
tions where individual cells that invest energetic resources for a
shared beneﬁt “reproduce better than cells using their resources
selﬁshly.” Such individual ﬁtness beneﬁts, Redﬁeld (2002) noted,
had been neither queried nor tested. As an alternative Redﬁeld
(2002) advanced the ‘diﬀusion-sensing’ (DS) hypothesis, which
proposed that individual cells synthesize AIs to ascertain the
physical properties of their environment to calibrate regulatory
and behavioral responses for their own beneﬁt. Although anthro-
pomorphism is never mentioned, the article’s last paragraph
gestures obliquely in that direction:
We seem to be most prone to errors with those processes that
most strongly distinguish us from bacteria—our sexuality and our
sociality. . . perhaps because we are social animals, we ﬁnd the idea
that bacteria have evolved communication and cooperation very
appealing (p. 369).
An inﬂuential review of bacterial communication 4 years
later endorsed the evolutionary approach, and drew a termino-
logical distinction between ‘signals,’ molecules ‘evolved for’ the
purpose of transmitting information between a sender and a
recipient (which according to the authors constitute communica-
tion), and mere ‘cues,’ molecules that acquire a role in a bacterial
behavioral economy but are not positively selected to be sig-
nals (Keller and Surette, 2006). These articles helped to inspire
theoretical and empirical work seeking alternative explanations
for autoinduction beyond the default assumption that QS was
communication.
It did not take long for proliferating proposals to generate a
terminological quagmire. Thus the ‘semantics of QS’ (Platt and
Fuqua, 2010) and ‘the confusion about diﬀusion’ (West et al.,
2012) became subjects for detailed investigation. Table 3 summa-
rizes alternative terms for autoinduction suggested by diﬀerent
researchers based on the dominant factor believed to be inﬂu-
encing concentrations of molecules in particular cases (Platt and
Fuqua, 2010). Although they approach the issue in very diﬀerent
ways, Platt and Fuqua (2010) and West et al. (2012) draw similar
conclusions that are relevant here.
First, both agree that some forms of autoinduction enable
social behavior in bacteria, and can be appropriately viewed as
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TABLE 3 | Alternative terms for autoinduction based on dominant factors
influencing concentrations of AI molecules.
Term Factor
Spatial positioning
Quorum sensing Local population density
Positional sensing Spatial organization of cells
Cluster sensing Spatial organization and distribution of cells
in clumps
Diffusion properties
Diffusion sensing Diffusion rates
Compartment sensing Limited diffusion due to enclosure
Confinement induced QS Limited diffusion due to enclosure
Spatial and diffusion properties
Efficiency sensing Local cell density and diffusion rates
Cumulative gradient sensing Accumulated cue as determined by cell
density, production rate, and diffusion rate
Environmental conditions
Diel sensing Cue stability due to pH conditions that vary
periodically
(Source: Platt and Fuqua, 2010, pp. 18, 383–387 trends in microbiology).
communicative. Both cite experiments in P. aeroginosa as the
only explicit attempts to test the social-signaling hypothesis, and
these ﬁndings support the hypothesis. Second, both agree that ter-
minological expansion has gone too far, and that QS is now so
entrenched that it can be used generically, with the understanding
that usage carries no social implications in the absence of further
investigation.
However, from a theoretical standpoint, considerable work
remains to be done, mainly because evolutionary theory is far
from univocal on the issue of how social behavior and commu-
nication evolve. A treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of
this article. I have argued elsewhere that bacterial sociality has
much to teach evolutionary biologists as they reﬁne the overar-
ching framework of evolutionary theory, which is still very much
a work in progress (Lyon, 2007).
Lifestyle Complexity = Signaling Complexity
There is a strong positive correlation between bacterial genome
size and the number of diﬀerent ST proteins a microbe can
synthesize (Ulrich and Zhulin, 2010), as well as between the
complexity of a bacterium’s lifestyle and the number of ST
pathways available to support its behavior and physiology
(Galperin, 2005; Ulrich et al., 2005). Similarly, ECFs tend to
be ‘under-represented and often absent’ in smaller bacterial
genomes and ‘over-represented’ in bacteria with more com-
plex lifestyles (Mascher, 2013). Moreover, there appears to be
a correlation between the complexity of the signaling path-
ways a bacterium possesses and the complexity of its behavior,
although more research is needed to see if this observation holds
generally.
According to the microbial signal transduction (MiST2)
database (Ulrich and Zhulin, 2010), from which all of the follow-
ing ﬁgures are derived, the largest and smallest genomes in the
bacterial kingdom are found among the gamma-proteobacteria
(see Table 2.) The genome of Buchnera aphidocola, a symbiont
of aphids, is a mere 400,000 base pairs (0.4 Mbp), which express
only three (3) 1CSs and no ECFs. The largest genome, weighing
in at an imposing 39.10 Mbp, belongs to Vibrio parahaemolyti-
cus, a pathogenic species that inhabits brackish saltwater and
has the capacity to withstand digestion both by seafood and
humans. V. parahaemolyticus, about which comparatively little
is known, expresses 3,321 ST systems, 79% of which (N = 2,624)
are 1CSs.
In contrast, consider the delta-proteobacterium M. xanthus,
a social predator that inhabits soil, arguably one of the most
complex ecosystems on the planet. Potentially the primate of
the eubacteria, M. xanthus is renowned for its myriad collec-
tive behaviors, including structured, multidimensional swarm-
ing motility (Kaiser and Warrick, 2014), pack-like predation
(Berleman and Kirby, 2009), and the use of chemical cues to lure
faster-moving prey (Shi and Zusman, 1993), as well as a complex
developmental sequence leading to fruiting body formation and
sporulation. At 9.14 Mbp, the M. xanthus genome is one of the
top 20 in size and expresses 687 ST systems, of which more than
half (54%,N = 372) are 2CSs. To date no other species, even those
with complex ways of life, appears to have such a large proportion
of 2CSs systems (see Table 2).
In addition, M. xanthus has twice the number of ECFs as
V. parahaemolyticus, providing greater ﬂexibility in respond-
ing to stress (Ulrich and Zhulin, 2010). Moreover, it has an
unusually large number of genes (97) involved in synthesizing
serine/threonine protein kinases (Goldman et al., 2006), signal-
ing proteins that are rare in prokaryotes but which are involved
in a wide variety of processes in unicellular and multicellular
eukaryotes. Inhibitors for eukaryotic protein serine, threonine
and tyrosine kinases have been shown to inhibit development in
M. xanthus to varying degrees.
Two decades ago, philosopher of science Godfrey-Smith
(1996) proposed the environmental complexity thesis to explain
‘the function of mind nature.’ Godfrey-Smith (1996) advanced
the idea that the evolutionary ratchet driving cognition to more
complex and powerful forms in some biological lineages is the
complexity of the ecological niche they inhabit. While Godfrey-
Smith did not have microbes in mind (see, in particular, Godfrey-
Smith, 2002), it may be that bacteria provide the best test case of
his thesis’s fundamental assertion.
Motility
Chemotaxis is the directed movement of one ormore cells toward
external conditions the organism(s) determine are more favor-
able for growth and survival, and away from conditions deter-
mined to threaten survival (Webre et al., 2003). Although often
studied and described in terms of discrete ‘attractants’ and ‘repel-
lents,’ the assessment of valence by the cell that underlies CT in
the presence of both has long been known to be non-linear even
in simple laboratory setups (Adler and Tso, 1974), to say nothing
of ecologically valid conditions. Bacterial motility takes several
forms, but ﬂagellar CT in E. coli was the ﬁrst bacterial system of
motility to be characterized in detail. Genes for the highly con-
served methyl-accepting proteins of the Che system are genomic
signposts for identifying CT systems in other bacteria (Ulrich and
Zhulin, 2010).
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Nevertheless, a stream of recent research into swarming motil-
ity in M. xanthus (Mignot et al., 2005, 2007; Nudleman et al.,
2005; Mauriello et al., 2009b; Nan et al., 2010; Kaiser andWarrick,
2011, 2014; Pathak et al., 2012) has thrown light on very diﬀerent
processes of motility that involve vastly more components and
produce much more observable behavior than ﬂagellar rotation
mediated by Che proteins.
Myxococcal swarming displays compelling similarities to
ﬂocking in birds, shoaling in ﬁsh and swarming in insects, the
mechanisms of which have yet to be resolved in these animals
(Wu et al., 2009). Other features appear to have mechanistic and
functional similarities to critical signaling pathways involved in
development in animals, notably, Wnt and Hedgehog (Kaiser
and Warrick, 2014). Yet another feature—‘resetting’ a cytoplas-
mic pacemaker that regulates periodic reversal in cell direction
(Kaiser and Warrick, 2014)—appears (to this writer) to bear a
functional resemblance to synaptic scaling in neurons, a process
critical to memory and learning in animals with nervous systems
(Turrigiano, 2008).
Swarming motility in M. xanthus has long presented chal-
lenges to researchers. Swarming uses two types of motility system,
initially believed to be for diﬀerent styles of life, (S)ocial or
(A)dventurous (Spormann, 1999). S-motility, the mechanism of
which has been known for decades, involves type IV pili at the
leading pole of the cell that retract, pulling the cell forward. A-
motility, on the other hand, has deﬁed adequate characterization,
despite identiﬁcation of about 40 genes involved in its implemen-
tation (Nan et al., 2010). However, recent research by Kaiser and
Warrick (2014) using ﬂuorescent protein labeling and time-lapse
microscopy has illuminated the role of A-motility in swarming,
and helped to make sense of important work over the previous
decade by several research groups.
This is what was known about swarming motility in M. xan-
thus before the time-lapse work. First, it is collective, involving
large numbers of cells, and relatively structured. Propelled by
type IV pili, individual cells tend to align with one another. A
large-scale manifestation of this is rippling, believed to be a strat-
egy for distributing nutrients from lysed prey (Berleman et al.,
2008). Although the proteins involved in myxococcal swarm-
ing are homologues of the classic CT proteins, the motility is
not chemotactic (Dworkin and Eide, 1983; Kaiser and Warrick,
2011), which shows how similar proteins can function quite
diﬀerently in similar contexts.
Second, cells in a swarm are constantly moving, periodically
reversing direction in a cycle optimized to roughly 8 min, which
appears to decrease the probability of collision as in shoals of ﬁsh
or ﬂocks of birds (Wu et al., 2009). According to a computational
model developed to generate predictions about periodic reversal,
an 8-min reversal interval results in cell orientations correlating
over 10 cell lengths (≈50 microns), whereas a 50-min reversal
interval results in correlation over only three cell lengths, and
only one cell length with no reversal. Experimental observation
aligns so closely with the model’s predictions that the probability
of positive natural selection is high (Wu et al., 2009).
Cell reversal appears to be somehow obligate to myxococcal
life, not simply to motility. In the hundreds of motility mutants
created since 1970, none to date has been unidirectional (Kaiser
and Warrick, 2011). This may be because the continuous move-
ment of cells in a swarm is necessary to facilitate access to oxygen
(above) and nutrients (below), and thus to reduce intercellular
competition (Kaiser and Warrick, 2011).
Third, the gliding motility of non-motile cells can be restored
through complementation (Velicer et al., 2002).Whereas in other
social species, (e.g., honeybees, primates) ‘cheaters’ or ‘freeload-
ers’ are punished to keep them cooperating for collective ben-
eﬁt (Putterman, 2010), in swarming M. xanthus they appear to
receive assistance. Complementation takes place through the eﬃ-
cient physical exchange between two cells of outer membrane
lipoproteins necessary for motility, the S-motility protein Tgl and
the A-motility protein CglB (Nudleman et al., 2005; Pathak et al.,
2012).
Exchange is eﬀected through the alignment and transient
attachment of focal adhesion clusters (FACs), complexes of at
least 15 known proteins located on the sides of the cell’s leading
half—not the leading pole, as in CT (Mignot et al., 2007). When
cells reverse direction the FACs retain their position on the lead-
ing half by relocating to the trailing half, along with S-motility
proteins and type IV pili (Mignot et al., 2005, 2007). In short,
the motility apparatus of the cell is constantly changing position
during swarming.
Cell reversal, together with S-motility and FAC relocation
during cell reversal, are regulated by a ‘pacemaker’ protein clus-
ter located in the cytoplasm comprising three proteins of the
Frz chemosensing pathway, the receptor for which is FrzCD
(Kaiser and Warrick, 2011). The size, number and location of
the Frz-clusters are constantly changing, or oscillating, and when
cells make side-to-side contact, the Frz-clusters transiently align
(Mauriello et al., 2009a). Frz-cluster number correlates with
the frequency of cellular reversal: fewer clusters are found in
hypo-reversing mutants, while more clusters are found in hyper-
reversing mutants (Mauriello et al., 2009a). Wu et al. (2009)
hypothesize that the frz genes “are part of a reversal clock” that
operates a “reversal switch” driven by the small G protein MglAB,
which induces the change in gliding direction. How the cyto-
plasmic pacemaker is connected to the cell surface remained
unclear, although Nan et al. (2010) described a complex of pro-
teins required for gliding that spanned the cytoplasm, inner
membrane and periplasm and included the A-motility protein
CglB.
Finally, swarms are diﬀerent from colonies. Swarmingmotility
depends on growth—it ceases when growth ceases—but swarms
expand mainly by movement, not growth (Kaiser and Warrick,
2011). Although cells in a swarm are in all stages of the growth
cycle, only 10% of swarm expansion is shown to be due to growth,
whereas in a colony 90% of expansion is growth-related (Kaiser
and Warrick, 2011).
The remainder of the section, which is derived entirely from
Kaiser andWarrick (2014), describes what time-lapsemicroscopy
of cells with ﬂuorescent-labeled proteins revealed about what
goes on in myxococcal swarms.
First and foremost, swarmingM. xanthus don’t justmove, they
build two types of structures, the function of which are unclear:
planar rafts, which have ﬂat tops, and rounded mounds, which
have ﬁve layers. Periodically, the cells on the top layer of the
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mounds translocate in an explosive, synchronized descent to the
peripheries of the fourth layer. The explosive descent appears to
be the result of a synchronized and simultaneous inhibition of all
motility engines, A and S. From their new position the translo-
cated cells slowly and asynchronously begin the climb to the
top again, using pili-driven S-motility. When they have reached
the top layer, the cells align into a compact arrangement as a
result of A-motility signal proteins. The entire process takes about
14 min.
The mechanism by which this occurs is unknown, but what
appears to take place is this. At low cell density, the FACs assem-
ble on the sides of the leading half of the cells. The FACs then
vanish and relocate to the trailing half, which upon cell reversal
becomes the leading half. At high cell density, cells transiently
attach to one another, side-by-side, as they move in the opposite
direction along their long axes, bringing the FACs into alignment.
Kaiser and Warrick (2014) hypothesize that pairing facilitates
passage of a signal between cells involving CglB and other A-
motility proteins (as per Nudleman et al., 2005; Pathak et al.,
2012). Supporting earlier observations of a motility complex,
CglB proteins are found in all of the compartment spaces of the
bacterium from the outer member to the periplasm and peptogly-
can succulus to the cytoplasm, where the Frz-cluster pacemakers
are located (Kaiser and Warrick, 2014). If the mechanism oper-
ates similarly to Wnt signaling in eukaryotes, as the researchers
propose, the four levels of layering could allow Cglb proteins
to pass the signal sequentially from one compartment space
to another, providing a high degree of speciﬁcity between the
upstream and downstream binding partners as well as with the
intracellular compartment.
The signaling synchronizes the Frz-cluster pacemakers in the
cell pair, which brings them into phase, eﬀectively ‘resetting’ both
cells to the average value of their pre-connection phases, a mech-
anism reminiscent of the scaling of synaptic ﬁring potentials in
neurons to ensure that overstimulation of one synapse does not
distort the functioning of the network (Turrigiano, 2008).
Pairing is followed by cell reversal, which allows the cells to
separate and move in a new direction, thus enabling the signal
(whatever it is) to be spread, and the cells to become synchro-
nized, which is necessary for coordinating the explosive descent.
Thus, as Kaiser and Warrick (2011, p. 1309) observe: “Every cell
in amound should be available for pairwise signaling, cells in each
layer are in contact with one another, and cells in a mound are
able to move from one layer to another.” CglB is critical to this
dynamic process of construction: CglB mutants can swarm but
they cannot build.
In short, the sensorimotor activity of M. xanthus is astonish-
ingly complex, and understanding this behavior may throw light
on the sensorimotor behavior of social animals, such as birds, ﬁsh,
and insects.
Predicting What Comes Next: Memory,
Learning and Anticipation
Traditionally it was thought that, however, complex their signal-
ing machinery, all bacteria can do is sense and respond to ensure
that existential parameters stay within the range of tolerance for
survival and reproduction (Freddolino and Tavazoie, 2012). A
growing body of evidence in the past decade suggests that bacteria
are not simply backward-looking responders to stimuli already
past—an assumption long-discredited in animals (Cahill et al.,
2001)—but are dynamic predictors actively oriented toward what
comes next (Tagkopoulos et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2009; Goo
et al., 2012).
In all animals and plants (Trewavas, 2014), the ability to pre-
dict is predicated on memory and learning, which can take place
within the life of an organism or across generations through epi-
genetic inheritance (Jablonka and Raz, 2009), very likely the basis
of many evolved traits. Circadian entrainment of physiological
processes to the planet’s most regular large-scale change—the
daily cycle of light and dark—is a well-known class of evolved
eukaryotic mechanisms that displays this anticipatory property.
Thus far the only prokaryotes found to possess a proper cir-
cadian clock are photosynthetic cyanobacteria (Ouyang et al.,
1998; Dvornyk et al., 2003), in which the phosphorylation state
of kai proteins, not genetic transcription and translation, con-
stitute the memory of elapsed time (Nakajima et al., 2005). The
hemi-methylated state of DNA just after replication is an exam-
ple of a genetic substrate for memory4. The key question, then,
is whether and how bacteria remember and learn, and to what
extent these capacities are relevantly like memory and learning in
more complex animals.
Memory
Memory, typically the capacity to retain information acquired
during the organism’s lifetime for a period suﬃcient to aﬀect
behavior, is part of the bedrock of cognition (Hilgard, 1980). For
centuries memory, especially in its long-term modes, has been
intrinsic to the anglophone concept of ‘mind’ (Earle, 1881). As
stated earlier, the idea that bacteria exhibit some form of mem-
ory, or ‘memory eﬀects,’ is now four decades old (Macnab and
Koshland, 1972; Adler and Tso, 1974; Brown and Berg, 1974).
In his seminal explication of the RR model, Koshland (1977)
describes the duration of protein phosphorylation as a bac-
terium’s memory because the period of modiﬁcation eﬀectively
holds information about the state of the environment at a par-
ticular time, and the capacity to retain information, however,
ﬂeeting, is “no less real or useful to the bacterium than the mem-
ory of humans is to their behavior.” On the model proposed by
Koshland (1980a), bacterial memory is “encoded in the enzymes
that form and remove the RR.” Importantly from the standpoint
of comparison with animals, the temporal duration of bacterial
memory is not ﬁxed, but is constituted (in CT proteins at least)
by the diﬀerence between “a fast excitation process and a slow
adaptation process,” which depends crucially on the strength and
salience of the stimulus and the pathway involved (Morimoto and
Koshland, 1991). The duration of response memory thus varies
greatly among diﬀerent chemotactic proteins, from seconds to
more than 5 min (Yamamoto et al., 2005), the observational limit
in the cited study. Moreover, chemotactic proteins may havemul-
tiple modiﬁable sites, suggesting the possibility of signalling and
memory at diﬀerent time-scales even within a single pathway
(DeFranco and Koshland, 1980).
4I am indebted to Klaas J. Jan Hellingwerf for this observation.
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Morimoto and Koshland (1991) proposed a physiological dis-
tinction between short-term and long-term cellular memory,
using the RR concept as a memory parameter. In the model short-
term memory occurs when “stimuli evoke a transient elevation of
the [amount of the] RR” in the cell, which “gradually returns to its
initial value” when the stimulus is removed. Long-term memory
occurs when “presentation of a second stimulus occurs before the
initial response has returned to the baseline,” and “[s]uch stim-
ulation results in a successive increase in the RR, which takes
longer to return to baseline” (p. 2061). In Kandel’s work with
Aplysia, the neuronal comparison that inspired Koshland, small-
molecule neurotransmitters act rapidly because they are degraded
and removed from the synaptic cleft by neuronal reuptake mech-
anisms, whereas neuropeptides passively diﬀuse away, and have
longer-lasting eﬀects (Kandel and Abel, 1995).
While protein dynamics are clearly important in memory pro-
cesses in vertebrates and invertebrates, long-term memory in
mammals, including humans, requires stable changes in neuronal
structure. DNA methylation is now recognized as the mecha-
nism by which such changes occur (Day and Sweatt, 2010). DNA
methylation in general and chromatin remodeling in particular
are also the mechanisms by which epigenetic learning takes place
in vertebrates and invertebrates, allowing an organism’s expe-
rience in one generation to be incorporated into the adaptive
repertoire of subsequent generations (Jablonka and Raz, 2009),
particularly in relation to stress (Franklin et al., 2010). Epigenetic
inheritance has been shown to modify stress responsiveness of
bacteria (Veening et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2014).
Signiﬁcantly, because stressful circumstances require immedi-
ate remedial action in a way attractive circumstances do not, in
humans and other mammals memories for adverse events tend to
bemuch stronger than those for positive events (Baumeister et al.,
2001), which is why aversive conditioning is such a powerful tool.
Learning
In humans short-term and ‘working’ memory ranges from sec-
onds to minutes, long-term memory from hours to decades
(Terry, 2005). Long-termmemory is often indistinguishable from
non-associative learning, a type of learning in which “presen-
tation of a particular stimulus alters the strength or probability
of a response according to the strength and temporal spac-
ing of the stimulus” (Rosenzweig et al., 1996, p. G-17). Non-
associative learning includes sensitization, the ampliﬁcation of
a response following presentation of a stimulus, and habitua-
tion, the attenuation or extinction of a response to a stimulus
upon repeated presentations (Shettleworth, 1998). Habituation
and sensitization have both been demonstrated in bacterial CT
(Koshland et al., 1982; Stock, 1999; Porter et al., 2011)—a discov-
ery that “gave some neurophysiologists apoplexy, because they
believed that a nervous system” was required (Taylor, 2004, p.
3761).
The operation of artiﬁcial and real neural networks depends
on memory and non-associative learning eﬀects, and the idea
began to circulate that the ST systems of a bacterial cell might
function as a neural network (Bray, 1990, 1995, 2009; Hellingwerf
et al., 1995). Signal ampliﬁcation is required for learning by neu-
ral networks, so a group of Dutch researchers decided to test the
idea that autoampliﬁcation of genes in certain 2CSs, which further
stimulates ST component production, might result in learning
eﬀects (Hoﬀer et al., 2001). Memory storage in animals with ner-
vous systems was long thought to involve a mechanism involving
an autophosphorylating protein kinase and paired phosphatase
that operate together as a bistable switch (Lisman, 1985).
The pho regulon of E. coli, which operates to detect
the metabolically critical nutrient Pi through the canonical
PhoR/PhoB 2CS, was selected as the signaling pathway for exper-
imentation (Hoﬀer et al., 2001). Upon stimulation the histi-
dine kinase PhoR autophosphorylates and transfers phosphoryl
groups to the cognate RR PhoR, which targets the pho operon,
which then ampliﬁes production of the two components. Thus
signaling through PhoR/PhoB boosts production of the transduc-
tion components.
Cells from an exponentially growing population of phoA
mutants were incubated ﬁrst in a Pi limited medium (for 45 min
at 42◦), then in a high Pi medium (for 1 h at 30◦). Later, the cells
were transferred to Pi limited medium and incubated at 30◦. The
speed at which alkaline phosphatase production was induced,
enabling the cell to scavenge traces of Pi or phosphorylated
compounds from the environment, was then measured.
As hypothesized, the cells previously incubated in the
Pi limited medium responded to the new limiting condi-
tions faster than the control cells incubated exclusively in
the high Pi medium. The faster response time correlated
with the accumulation of ST components, a good probabil-
ity that the response was the result of operon autoampliﬁ-
cation rather than “a consequence of unspeciﬁc physiological
eﬀects.” Moreover, the learning behavior was “mechanistically
and eﬀectively diﬀerent from the adaptation eﬀects observed
in CT,” and appeared to resemble immune system learning
(Hoﬀer et al., 2001).
Another series of experiments involving B. subtilis are sim-
ilarly indicative of non-associative learning. Wolf et al. (2008)
selected B. subtilis for its sensitivity to environmental conditions
and the well-known mechanisms governing sporulation. These
mechanisms, triggered as part of a stress response, exhibit switch-
like bistability, the basis of memory eﬀects in computers, some
physical compounds (i.e., magnetized iron), and neuronal activity
in animals. Bistability is believed to have a role in human mem-
ory, particularly working memory (Durstewitz et al., 2000), but it
has also been implicated in memory-associated processes in cel-
lular plasticity and diﬀerentiation, e.g., in bone marrow (Wang
et al., 2009).
Sporulation is an irreversible, energetically costly process
of morphological and functional diﬀerentiation initiated as a
last resort under starvation conditions (Dworkin and Losick,
2005) or a ‘bet-hedging’ strategy when nutrient supplies dete-
riorate (de Jong et al., 2011). The developmental sequence
unfolds over 8 h, and results in the formation of specialized
cells resistant to heat, chemical and UV stress. This involves
the death of a signiﬁcant proportion of the population, so the
existential ramiﬁcations of movement toward sporulation are
profound (for the survival of individual cells, at least), even
before commitment becomes irreversible (Gonzalez-Pastor et al.,
2003).
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Three diﬀerent strains of B. subtilis were grown under 10 dif-
ferent conditions, which varied according to the nutrient richness
of the growth medium (rich and less-rich) and the density to
which the population was allowed to grow, of which there were
ﬁve classes (Wolf et al., 2008). In addition to a wild-type control,
two ﬂuorescent ‘reporter’ strains were created to measure three
variables: (1) commitment to sporulation, a bistable process indi-
cated by SpoIIE expression; (2) synthesis of AprE, a degradative
enzyme that breaks down food sources, functions as a nutrient
locator in deprived conditions, and shares many regulators with
sporulation, but has a diﬀerent expression pattern and is not
believed to be bistable; and (3) growth, an indicator of general
ﬁtness.
After the growth period, the 30 diﬀerent cell populations
were sorted into identical densities and exposed to a common
stressor, a starvation salt medium known to induce sporula-
tion. Every 15 min for 24 h the 30 samples were measured in
relation to growth, AprE synthesis, and commitment to sporu-
lation (SpoIIE expression). Although Wolf et al. (2008) deﬁned
short-term memory eﬀects as those measured within the ﬁrst
11 h following exposure to the stress medium, in humans this
timescale already would be said to involve long-term memory.
The study found that diﬀerences in life history gave rise to dif-
ferences of varying strength in patterns of behavior relative to
three variables (SpoIIE expression, AprE synthesis and growth)
following a common stressor. Some of these eﬀects lasted up to
36 h, far beyond the measurement period, which could either
indicate ‘lifelong’ memory or the beginning of epigenetic memory
across generations.
The data also suggest that memory strength and persistence
are highly correlated with the energetics of survival. Growth
medium was a better predictor of subsequent behavior than the
density to which the original population was grown. Cells grown
on the less-rich medium prior to exposure to the starvation salts
pursued a more aggressive strategy. On average they grew “very
fast” after exposure, induced AprE synthesis “after a brief lag,” and
continued to grow even as the sporulation machinery switched
on. By contrast, cells grown in the richer, Luria broth medium
“seem[ed] to adopt a wait-and-see strategy,” did not grow and
delayed sporulation and AprE synthesis “for many hours.”
As noted earlier, the ﬁnding that sporulation dynamics trig-
gered by worsening circumstances exhibited “the most memory”
(Wolf et al., 2008), despite involving the most energetically costly
and far-reaching changes in the population, is consistent with
results in human psychology and animal behavior (Lyon, 2014).
Similarly, recent studies demonstrating anticipatory behavior in
bacteria involve responses to predictable stressors.
Prediction
The ability to anticipate and pre-emptively respond to regu-
lar changes in the environment confers a considerable ﬁtness
advantage, and has been observed in bacteria quite apart from
circadian periodicity. Fruiting body formation in M. xanthus in
the presence of nutrients from prey displays a predictive qual-
ity (Berleman and Kirby, 2007). Fruiting body formation was
long assumed to be a response to the stimulus of starvation,
because that is how it is commonly induced for experiment,
but Berleman and Kirby (2007) found that a mere ‘step down’
in nutrients, not depletion, is suﬃcient to initiate the process,
which ceases if nutrient availability increases. Nevertheless, only
recently has anticipatory behavior been explicitly tested in bac-
teria using as cues predictable environmental changes across the
life cycle.
Escherichia coli inhabits several ecological niches during its
life cycle, from water, sediment and soil to the mammalian gas-
trointestinal tract (Mitchell et al., 2009). To determine whether
E. coli signaling networks are capable of predictive behavior “in a
fashion similar to metazoan nervous systems,” Tagkopoulos et al.
(2008, p. 1313) tested strains under conditions mimicking the
transition from the outside world to the gastrointestinal tract of a
mammalian host. As they enter the oral cavity cells immediately
experience rising temperatures up to 37◦. As they transition to the
gut available oxygen drops precipitously to anaerobic conditions.
If the homeostatic (sense-respond) framework is correct, E. coli
should not repress respiration until a drop in oxygen is detected.
On the other hand, if enteric bacteria are capable of dynamic pre-
dictive behavior, rising temperatures should induce respiratory
repression.
This is precisely what the studies showed. Exposure to temper-
ature upshift, from 25◦ to 37◦, not only induced the heat shock
response regulon, but also strongly repressed genes encoding
components of the molecular machinery for aerobic respiration,
rapidly reprogramming to anaerobic mode. Similarly, a down-
shift in temperature (mimicking the organism’s excretion from
the host) initiated the return to aerobic respiration. The two
responses are so tightly coupled that strains were evolved in the
laboratory to reverse the sequence of expression; a downshift in
oxygen activated the heat shock response in the evolved strain
(Tagkopoulos et al., 2008).
Tight coupling of the two pathways in combination with sus-
ceptibility to alteration in the sequence of expression suggests a
high probably of crosstalk between the signaling pathways. In the
second series of experiments, crosstalk between two metabolic
pathways in E. coli were not merely decoupled but completed dis-
sociated (Mitchell et al., 2009). These discoveries would have been
impossible without taking the organism’s habitat and ecology into
account (Tagkopoulos et al., 2008).
In the mammalian GI tract E. coli is exposed to nutrient
sugars in a sequence: ﬁrst lactose, then maltose. Mitchell et al.
(2009) conﬁrmed that in the presence of lactose, transcription
of the pathways for metabolizing maltose begins before maltose
is detected. The dependency is asymmetrical, however. Exposure
to maltose does not induce lactose utilization. Furthermore, in
evolutionary experiments with a conditioning regime in which
maltose does not follow lactose, over 500 generations E. coli loses
the ability to predict the ecologically important sequence, but not
the ability to utilize maltose. When maltose is detected, physi-
ology is still modiﬁed for its metabolism in the evolved strains.
What was lost during laboratory evolution, the researchers con-
clude, is “the asymmetrical cross talk between the two pathways”
(p.221).
The third set of predictive experiments tested responses to
QS in three species of proteobacteria with radically diﬀerent
lifestyles: Burkholderia glumae, a rice pathogen; Burkholderia
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pseudomallei, a human pathogen; and Burkholderia thailanden-
sis, non-pathogenic saprophyte (Goo et al., 2012). QS signaling
is an indicator of increasing cell density but could also predict
the limits of population carrying capacity. In all three species,
QS induced physiological preparation for stationary phase, sur-
vival of which requires the alteration of global metabolic pro-
cesses. In contrast to QS-intact strains, QS mutants showed
“massive and rapid population crashes,” which began shortly
after commencement of the stationary phase. The cause of the
population crash proved to be ammonia-related alkaline tox-
icity due to amino acid catabolism associated with stationary
phase.
While both QS-competent and QS-mutant cells produced
ammonia at roughly similar rates, the QS-competent strains
were protected from catastrophe by QS-mediated production of
oxalate, which counteracts base toxicity. Oxalate is produced at
neutral pH, which suggests that QS-dependent “anticipatory pro-
duction” of oxalate is not induced by a pH-dependent regulatory
mechanism. The authors conclude the results “show that QS can
function to allow anticipation of overcrowding and promote bac-
terial survival at maximum population carrying capacity, and
provide insight into howQS bacteria have evolved to control both
public and private goods,” namely, oxalate production and cell
survival (Goo et al., 2012, p. 19778).
Based on these and other ﬁndings, Freddolino and Tavazoie
(2012) assert that the homeostatic paradigm can no longer sus-
tain an appropriate understanding of cellular behavior, whereas
a ‘predictive-dynamic framework’ is more explanatory. They
conclude (correctly, in my view) that regulatory networks in
microbes and neural networks in metazoans have essentially the
same function, and that microbiologists are now moving into
behavioral territory previously occupied by animals with ner-
vous systems. Whether these also share mechanisms with similar
design principles remains to be seen.
A cautionary note must be sounded, however. Researchers
in two of the studies described here (Tagkopoulos et al., 2008;
Mitchell et al., 2009) claim their discoveries are demonstrations
of associative learning. However, conditioning in these cases
is clearly epigenetic. Whether this will count as ‘genuine con-
ditioning’ remains an open question. Also, Tagkopoulos et al.
(2008) claim that one of the implications of their research is that
bacteria possess internal models or representations of the envi-
ronment. The existence of representations and models, except in
a metaphorical sense, is still open to debate even in humans (see,
for example, Bechtel, 1998; van Gelder, 1998; Haselager et al.,
2003), so microbiologists need to be careful.
Putting it All Together: Signal Integration
So how does an individual bacterium integrate the informa-
tion from a dizzying array of signaling pathways—sensorimotor,
physiological, chemosensory, and communicative—into a coher-
ent adaptative response? The short answer is we don’t know. This
is perhaps the greatest challenge facing work in this ﬁeld. We
have already seen how cross talk can link substantially diﬀerent
signaling pathways (heat shock and respiration) to enable cells
to predict regular changes in their habitat, but the mechanism
is unknown. Mathematical or computational frameworks for
modeling speciﬁc signaling pathways are proliferating, well, like
BOX 2 | Implications for future research.
Object sensing. James Shapiro described as “the greatest paper nobody has read.”∗ Dworkin’s (1983) report of the directed movement of M. xanthus swarms
toward three-dimensional objects in multiple experiments. The swarms moved toward biologically salient objects (a clump of prey cells) but also toward chemically
inert objects (sterilized glass beads). These experiments should be replicated, and, if the findings are confirmed, the mechanism investigated. It would be interesting
to see whether previously uncharacterized photoreceptors are involved.
Bistability. Given the critical importance of bistability to cognition in more complex animals, what light can bistable regulatory networks in bacteria throw on the
phenomenon, including its role in perception, learning and memory?
Endogenous activity. One of the greatest recent challenges to the classical computational view of cognition has been the discovery of endogenous, often oscillatory
activity in the brain independent of external stimuli (Bechtel, 2012). Can oscillatory activity in regulatory circuits governing prokaryotic behavior tell us anything about
the processes involved in endogenous brain activity?
Nanobrain. The cluster of chemoreceptors that governs motility (and other behaviors?) in E. coli provides a relatively tractable model for understanding how signals
from multiple sources can be integrated into a behavioral response but still presents a monumental challenge.
Valence. Virtually nothing is known, in bacteria or humans, about how combinations of external stimuli of differing valence are integrated with interoceptive cues
into a coherent behavioral response. Even more basically, hardly any information exists on the power spectrum (i.e. intensity and frequency) of signals to which any
microorganism in any natural environment is exposed, except for circadian (24-h) frequency. Well-characterized stress responses in prokaryotes, particularly those in
which multiple behavioral options exist, provide potentially productive platforms for investigation.
Memory and learning. Bacterial memory is yet to be properly investigated, and the mechanisms by which it occurs definitively characterized in different species.
The possibility of associative learning in prokaryotes also remains terra incognita. M. xanthus may prove a good candidate for such exploration, given the unusually
large number of genes (97) involved in producing serine/threonine protein kinases (STPK) in this diverse predator (Goldman et al., 2006). CaMKII is an STPK capable
of autophosphorylation that is involved in multiple signaling cascades involved in homeostasis in animals, and also is thought to be important in human memory and
learning. It would be interesting to see if there is any sequence homology between CaMKII and any of the myxobacterial STPKs.
Communication. The ability of QS molecules to participate in modifying the behavior of dispersed cells, particularly in relation to stress, has led to the suggestion
that they may be precursors of hormonal messengers in animals, and indeed some homologies have been identified, for example, between AHLs and ghrelin (Tizzano
and Sbarbati, 2006). Hormones, particularly those associated with the HPA axis, are major mediators of cognitive, affective and motive function in humans, (Vedder,
2008). The HPA axis, in turn, is the major mediator of the stress response in humans. Is there an evolutionary relation between QS molecules and the stress-induced
molecular messengers of the mammalian brain, including not only hormones and neuropeptides but also immune elements such as cytokines?
*Shapiro made the remark in a workshop presentation attended by the author at the University of Exeter, in July 2006.
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bacteria in exponential growth (see, for example, Di Paola et al.,
2004; Mehta et al., 2009; Liebal et al., 2010; Mitchell and Pilpel,
2011). How successful these proposals will prove remains to be
seen.
At present prokaryotes oﬀer very few examples of spe-
cialized information-processing ‘organs’ for investigation. The
chemosensing receptor clusters at the leading pole of ﬂagellated
bacteria such as E. coli have already been suggested as anal-
ogous in important respects to neural clusters in metazoans
with nervous systems (Stock et al., 2002). With an estimated
10,000 receptors in each cluster, with ﬁve diﬀerent sensory tar-
gets and multiple binding sites, the computational complexity of
the nanobrain is not especially tractable, however, (see Box 2).
A second candidate involved in sensorimotor coordination are
the FACs on the sides of M. xanthus together with the pro-
tein complex for transducing signals from the cell surface to
the oscillator-regulator located in the cytosol. A third candi-
date organ for specialized information-processing in bacteria
is the ‘stressosome,’ a large (multimillion dalton) protein com-
plex associated with the general stress response that integrates
multiple signals into a single outcome (σB activation), and is best-
characterized in B. subtilis, although it is found many microbial
phyla (Marles-Wright et al., 2008)5. Interestingly, the stresso-
some of B. subtilis recently has been found to be activated by a
blue-light photoreceptor (van der Steen et al., 2013).
In actual fact, we have only begun to scratch the surface.
Conclusion
While JacquesMonod’s famous assertion that “anything. . .true of
E. coli must also be true of an elephant” (Friedmann, 2004) is an
overstatement for many reasons, the Darwinian assumption that
biological functions diﬀer substantially ‘in form but not in kind’
5I am indebted to Klaas J. Jan Hellingwerf for this observation.
continues to be born out in surprising ways, particularly since
the advent of comparative genomics. Phylogenetic snobbery in
the study of biological cognition is misguided, and for the same
reasons such a bias would be in genetics or the study of respira-
tion: there is much to be learned about the basics of biological
functions and processes in ‘simple’ systems.
It is always satisfying, and the life sciences are seen to advance,
when connections can be drawn between widely diﬀering phyla
with respect to important biological functions and processes. The
study of cognition, for much of its existence, has proven resis-
tant to this impulse. However, modern biology’s tools of genetic
manipulation, comparative genomics, and molecular imaging
techniques that enable the study of single behaving cells repre-
sent the means by which a continuum might be established, if it
exists in fact.
Although knowledge of ST in both prokaryotes and eukaryotes
has increased spectacularly in the interim due to technological
and methodological innovations, interest in exploring the par-
allels between prokaryotic and neuronally based behavior has
waned substantially since its heyday in the 1970s and 1980s. It
is time to revive the project. The technical means available are
better than they have ever been.
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